IRREVERSIBLE IMAGINATIONS IN CHANGING

We observe that Aristotle is not very interested in the term “eikasia”
which Platon chooses as one of the key elements of “doksasta”. Aristotle
prefers to use “phantasia” derived from the term “phaino” instead of this term.1
However the term has been used as “phos” in the translation made by Guilelmus
de Moerbeka into Latin and according to Thomas Aquinas this term has been
derived from “phanos” which means “appearance”.2 The reason why the
light is important here is that the light animates the colours which help us
recognise the boundaries of the objects. In terms of this meaning, the light
turns into the key requirement for the imagination’s having the variety of
objects comprising the world.

Aristotle includes the imagination, which Plato puts in the last order
when grading the knowledge, in the sensual part of life but not in the physical
part. Therefore he means that imagination serves as a door between the sensual
one and the perceivable one and turns the separate worlds of his teacher into a
coexisting partnership. If we continue to think with such a realistic attitude,
we may state that imagination has an indispensable/undeniable function in
forming a considerable part of the individual’s conceptual world. Firstly, by
stating that I will do my best for improving the deficiencies of this discourse
resulting from the choice in favour of /the realistic attitude/ in the
beginning, I can tell that imagination is not only an important step for an
individual’s forming his/her own intellectual/conceptual world but also it is
an important threshold in forming the relationship (in terms of various
opinions/correctness basis) between the individual “himself/herself” and
“his/her” world.

Imagination turns out to be a “base” to be taken seriously both when we
are producing (mental) frameworks determining our conceptions through the
formed objects presented to us since the moment we were “introduced” with the
social life and when we are “interpreting” the world outside us according to these
conceptions originally vacant but later attributed with certain meanings.
Therefore neither the imaginations nor the world representations created by
these imaginations can be regarded as the same in different individuals. As a
natural result of this impossibility, a wide variety of meanings and socio-cultural
formations are come across in the world.

“Communication” inevitably proves to be one of the most important words
or activities for people in a world full of such different perceptions. The
relation of the communication with imagination and what it introduces is
apparent. However it is necessary to focus on what is to be meant exactly by
the word communication, as well. The
question of what kind of a communication may occur between the attitude leading
the subject into a deadlock by dividing the world into parts and the attitude
facing serious deadlocks in terms of interpreting the world without the subject
himself/herself and his/her deeds is an important question. However maybe there
is no answer to this question! Because communication exactly means a symmetrical
relationship and from the very beginning this symmetry eliminates the choice of
monologue that’s only one side’s putting his/her ideas across. The
communication introduced here can only be expressed with a term presented to
the philosophy by Plato: dialogue.

Dialogue is a way of communication and it must definitely be
distinguished from the terms like chat and conversation. The communication
aimed with dialogue is the activity of making the structure concealed mutually
in the words observable and understandable for the both sides. If this activity
is to be regarded as a type of communication, a special care must be taken over
putting the expressions mutually on a certain base of agreement. The main
expectation of the communication should be agreement and the agreement can only
occur through a clearly understood dialogue.

Communication must certainly have an intermediary role like clarifying
the identification of the subject transmitting the message and making the
receiver-side realize this clear structure, as well. Within this context,
communication is a way of realisation. Of course, realisation can not only be
regarded as ordinarily checking the particular resistance of the receiver-side.
Realisation is an activity of measuring resulting from “trying to” understand
the logic and rhetoric of a whole existence plane which shows this resistance.
When expressed roughly, communication should definitely be a product of the
mutual (realizing each other and making the others realize) understanding and
efforts of the all transmitting sides over a “common” existence plane.
Otherwise, it will be a one-sided interaction in which one side rejects the
“other”. So, for the one forming it, the functionality of the other will turn
into a simple, baseless and meaningless situation assumed for explaining it. Here
I will mainly focus on this making the “other” side meaningless.

This situation I have handled shortly until now should be considered
together with the the relation of individual people’s socially-grantedness with
the time and space. Therefore, the imaginational and accordingly perceptual-intellectual
support given to each condition of time and space by the physical environment
and the socially-grantedness, independently include unique examples and its
repeatability in another social structure is a very weak probability. So, when analyzing the social structures, applying
to the basic characteristics created by the imaginational existence of the
society or social structure analysed is useful for forming the communication in
a healthy way. Otherwise, the cosmos conception of the communicator will
inevitably reflect on the communication activity itself while communicating with
any society. This situation weakens the effectiveness of the communication and
creates a dim image.

For concretizing what I have mentioned until now – with an approach we
may call arbitrary to some extent- I want to make a quotation from the
conversation Samuel P. had with Nathan Gardels, editor of NpQ in 1993.
Appearing as a kind of ideologist and gaining reputation with his approach he
named as “The Clash of Civilizations”-which is an ordinary social engineering
theory, impossible to be based on a historical and social dynamic-, Samuel P.
Huntington says that:” After the Cold War ended, international
politics completed its western phase. Henceforth the center of the global
policy will be the interaction between the Western and Non-western cultures.
Fault lines of the conflicts to be occur in the future can be observed easily
in the Eurasia. While the ideological rift in
Europe died out, cultural rift among Western Christianity of the Europe, Orthodox Christianity and Islam appeared again.
Today, it may be stated that the most separatist line of the Europe
is the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year of 1500, as the
English scientist William Wallace told.

At one side of that line, Protestants getting richer gradually and Catholics
shared a common history leading from feudalism to Renaissance and Reform and
later to Enlightenment Age and French Revolution and finally to the Industrial
Revolution. On the other side of the same line there were economically less
developed Orthodox and Muslim people; these were the people of the Ottoman and
czar empires. These people can not be counted to be affected much by the modernizing
experiences of the Europe located in their West.”

MAGISTER DIXIT!

When an average Europe history book is
looked through, a lot of material can be found to be in compliance with this
determination. However mentioning Europe as a
continent is impossible. As a continent, Europe
is an artificial geography formed by the European’s attempt for constructing a
basement for him. This subject may be kept out of our view for now because I
mainly want to show what Huntington
tries to do here. Here, mainly for realising a definite and exact differentiation,
Hungtington uses some formations and activities appeared in different times and
places of the Europe –but definitely not of
the West- as a mean of a certain humanitarian separation. In this way, for
example; societies which have not involved in this social transformation and
developments may fall into the state of “the other” by themselves and the Europe can hardly be aware of its self-conscious through
this imposed “otherness”. This primitive categorization activity has certain
dilemmas in itself and it is necessary to state from the beginning that the way
of perceiving these marks out the boundaries of the environment someone is
in.

To put in other words, those who have read this dilemma as a positive
separatism continuously lead their existence from one crisis into another
regarding themselves as Westerner or European or westernised European. Those
who have read this through a negative grammar can not reflect the imaginational
values of those who prepared the canvas of the painting in the beginning,
exactly. Therefore they can’t avoid being in the intellectual crawling phase so
in the cycle of imported crises for which they are not responsible, they are
made to realise their own attitudes towards life and to understand and analyse
even if they can not realise. This state of crawling and being subjected to
some impositions about forming an existence environment which is not original,
naturally results in the worlds of artificial concepts derived from the
artificial imaginations resulting from being unfamiliar to the particular
values of Europe.

Apparently, solving the thread of problems of this artificiality is very
difficult. Therefore the directness of the question of what the non-European
cultures are is in danger. Instead of this, I believe that the question of what
being European is can create a general conception which includes all the inner
and exterior elements or we suppose that it includes. Then what is being European?
What are the particular values of Europe? Is
it possible to mention a Europe idea?

It is apparent that Europe does not
have a particular geography. With an arbitrary attitude, Europe was determined
with a conception, not very neat; it was separated roughly from its twin, Asia as if those who reside there needed such a mainland
for expressing themselves. Asia minor was counted to be different from the so-called
Europe; however, the place, where a plane taking off from Khalkedon (current
Kadıköy- a district of Istanbul) and flying constantly towards the east without
any transfer, lands after about 4 hours is still regarded as Europe. So, we may
observe that a mentality, accompanying to the Huntington’s
concerns, has been effective in determining the Europe
geographically, as well. Besides, the concerns causing the peninsula, revealing
an important vain of the Ancient Greek Civilization, one of the tripets forming
the base of the culturally determined Europe (Asia Minor), to be excluded from
the boundaries of geographical Europe reveals that it is necessary to
understand the content of the idea of being European clearly.

Edmund Husserl delivered a speech titled “Die philosophie in der Krisis der
europaeischen Menscheit” in the Cultural Association of Vienna (Wiener Kulturbund) on the date of 7th
May 1935. There wasn’t a written copy of the speech at that time and he had to
deliver a similar speech after 3 days. In fact, Husserl included the problem of
history and culture, which had not been included in Husserl’s phenomenology
until his late times, in the center of this book -having the opportunity of
evaluating in his book, ‘Krisis’ he wrote being affected by “Wilhelm Dilthey
and Martin Heidegger”.

In fact the speech refers to the
hole of problems into which the Europe
humanity fell. Husserl asks the question revealing the basis of his speech like
this- Here I think that a quotation, which may be a bit long’ is necessary:“Wir stellen die Frage: Wie charakterisiert
sich die geistige Gestalt Europas? Also Europa nicht geographisch,
landkartenmaeβig verstanden, als ob danach der Umkreis der hier territorial
zusammenlebenden Menschen als europaeisches Menschentum umgrenzt werden sollte.
Im geistigen Sinn gehören offenbar die englischen Dominions, die Vereinigten
Staaten usw. zu Europa, nicht aber die
Eskimos oder Indianer der Jahrmarktsmenagerien oder die Zigeuner, die dauernd
in Europa herumvagabundieren. Es handelt sich hier offenbar unter dem Titel
Europa, um die Einheit eines geistigen Lebens, Wirkens, Schaffens: mit all den
Zwecken, Interessen, Sorgen und Mühen, mit den Zweck gebinden, mit den
Anstalten, den Organisationen. Darin wirken die einzelnen Menschen in
mannigfachen Sozietaeten verschiedener Stufen, in Familien, in Staemmen,
Nationen, alle innerlich geistig verbunden und, wie ich sagte, in der Einheit
einer geistigen Gestalt. Den Personen,
Personenverbaenden und alle ihren Kulturleistungen soll damit ein allverbindender
Charakter erteilt sein.”[1]

In a little while, we will continue the quotation from a more different
perspective. What is noteworhty here is that Husserl is closely interested in
the idea of the Europe of culture and values as if he wanted to get rid of the
problem about geographical Europe on which
we’ve just touched shortly. The interlinear reading here is that British
colonies refers only to theUnited States of America and only the word, “etc.”
is used for the others. What is to be meant here is that the real owners of the
colonies are not included in the definiton of the Europe.
It is not possible that these real owners can contribute to a success to be
attained within the idea of Europe. The basis
of this impossibility is the uniqueness in the spiritual relations of the
generations called as European. The core of this uniqueness has been concealed
in the institutional mentality and behaviour patterns supported by this.
Seemingly, humanity has been graded with this kind of a historical
classification to be counted as extremely superficial.

Finding the grounds of this grading in the Husserl is certainly possible.
If we continue to the quotation: “”Die geistige Gestalt Europas”-was ist das?
Die der Geschichte Europas (des geistigen Europas) immanente philosophische
Idee aufzuweissen, oder, was dasselbe ist, die ihr immanente Teleologie, die
sich vom Gesichtspunkt der universalen Menschheit überhaupt kenntlich macht als
der Durcbruch und Entwicklungsanfang einer neuen Menschheitsepoche, der Epoche
der menschheit, die nunmehr bloss leben will und leben kann in der freien
Gestaltung ihres daseins, ihres historischen Lebens aus Ideen der Vernunft, auf
unendlichen Aufgaben.”[2]

It is possible to observe that Husserl has a perspective which seems helpless
in getting rid of Hegel and his history view. Apart from this situation,
Husserl introduces us to a new era in a way, which is definetely Europen/or
expected to be so by setting out from the style and attitude of the Europe
which were adopted by the universal humanity and introduced in a way in the
past. Those who will make this introduction are again Europeans as a result of
a big coincidence! Maybe with this introduction, reference necessary for the
whole world, outside Europe and European, to
determine its own place has been completed as a result of the expansion in the
idea itself.

It is not surprising at all that this reference bears a realised
difference and through this it serves as a strong invitation to those who are
not European to behave “like” European. When mentioning the Indians, Husserl
means that Europe can never become Indianised and the reason for this is
teleology adopted by the Europe and most probably only by the Europe.
This is not surprising, as well and in fact at one step beyond this, there is
another attitude which is not “surprising” at all again; it is the fact that
this teleology is immanent! When forming this judgement requiring a quite high
self-reliance, European people can question themselves personally. Even if
Husserl doesn’t express this clearly in any way, European one never intends to
leave this task of questioning, to the “authority” he/she put against
himself/herself in the name of “the other”. Because the view, which suggests
that entellkheia is ‘immanent’ in itself, should never be thought to prefer to
share this immanence with “the other” starting from the farthest point to which
its relationship is possible.

I think the difficulty in thinking this is due to Husserl’s intention in
choosing this term. In no case can I give a satisfactory answer to the question
of what this intention exactly is. However, as the subject is to give an
explanation to the question of what being European is and even to create a main
door, the importance of the term increases to a large extent. Because the term “entelekheia”
is not a simple term and it is not possible that Husserl didn’t know the
historical background of this term. The term was used by Hans Driesch, who
lived in Husserl’s time, as well. Driesch is the author of the book titled the History of Theory of Vitalism (London, 1914). Although
Driesch’s using this term was meaningful in the framework of the vitalist
movement, Husserl’s using this term in a social context does not cause a
distortion in the meaning of the term. Acording to Driesch, some living
organisms don’t have a transcending life-element. This is situation is an end-intentionality
state. Besides it must be stated that Driesch’s this approach icludes a “Hegelianist”
anxiety apart from a simple “Aristotelianist” approach.

It is not very difficult to tell that Husserl’s approach includes “Hegelianist”
anxieties, as well. It is possible to suggest that his aim at using this term
is completely related with the meaning problem in the philosophy. However, it
is apparent in the quoatation we have made above that entelekheia is not a
simple philosophical activity. Even if it is acknowledged to be so, philosophy
is not an activity carried out by itself. Human is necessary for this activity
and the European person is the human having the requirements needed for this
activity! The explanation of what Husserl did is not limited to this. He wants
to tell one more important thing by turning the entelekheia into a state which
European person has immanently:

Aristoteles adopts the opportunity to use the term “entelekheia” in the
second book of his work, Peri Psykhe:
“Matter is potentiality, while form
is realization or actuality, and the word actuality is
used in two senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge and the exercise
of it.”[3] The term, which Aristotle
used apparently, has not been preferred in the second translation. Instead of
this, the term “actuality” has been used and actually this reflects the
Aristotelian meaning. The Aristotelian meaning gives a clear sense of
competency.

However, it is clear that what Husserl is trying to tell here is closely
related with the Aristotelian meaning: Europe
is the very power that will introduce the whole world to the competence. This
power will have all the previous activities referred by everybody and all at
once. Although the activities before that have brought some innovations, the
act of formation they need to have for being mentionable has been realised by
the European. To put in other words, the European will have the whole history
of the world completed realising itself by means of entelekheia he has inside
and he will give it competence.

To state expressly, these kinds of classifications, regarding the change
as the steps taken for the sake of the change itself, have been mentioned in
many instances in the history of the world. Boethius’s grading of knowledge, Nicolai
Hartmann’s theory of categories and Henry Lewis Morgan’s enterprise for
classifying the societies, are based on the efforts introducing always this
known style. For example, Boethius’s “ratio” needs “sensus” and “imaginatio”
for revealing its efficieny but these two grades are definitely not aware of
the efficency of “ratio”. There is a similar case in the relation between
“intelligentia”-“ratio”, as well.

I do not know, to what extent did Husserl’s dramatical framework
excluding the Gipsies, Native Americans and Eskimos (and maybe some other
societies he bore in his mind but didn’t mentioned) from the Europe,
which he mentioned three years before his death, disturb his audiences.
However, if Husserl did not die in 1938 and he faced the the most dreadful
event, the world witnessed, in a concentration camp, he would recognise that
the walls of his view classifying the Gipsies as “the other” surrounded another
society at that time and they would tell him that he would not be in the Europe
anymore as a “muselmann”!

Here, the main point I want to understand and share with you is that the
element determining the relation between us and the people we want to
communicate –any kind of communication- should not be a quality or degree
difference tried to be created and/or discovered in between. Using the
difference of quality and degree peculiar to the cultures for the sake of
superiority –socalled- of some people and societies over the others, causes the
universal reason, mainly functioning for the whole, to stop and create crises.
That is why I gave the Husserl example above. The compulsion to change made on
“the others” by these kinds of determinations created for explaining the
history and the period we are in, result in broken imaginations and separated
conciousness.

The history of humanity is a big book embracing all the people and
cultures without excluding none of them even for a moment. The different
letters and words we come accross as the pages of this book have been turned
over, can create enough inspiration to produce an oddity which is different
from the “reality” comprising the different relations of these and “the other”
of the one, “previous” or “ahead”. However, this oddity is just an optical
illusion. In fact the resourse of the simplicity enabling further reading is
the decoding inspiration given to “the other” by “the one, previous/ahead”.

The point to which I want to attract attention here is that creating
“the others” for the sake of determining ourselves as Husserl or some others
mentioned above did, produce soothing dynamics neither for ourselves nor the
people outside ourselves. What those who claim to be a model regarding
themselves –in all social, cultural and individual meanings- as explanation of
the Idea or the Idea itself are trying to do for carrying out an Ideal reading,
which will reduce the course on each particular wing of the existence to one,
is the effort to make all the humanity turn its face to themselves. This desire
for being universal and the contest of globalisation are fraternal.
Globalisation is an action to be realised by those who take part in the contest
of globalisation and within this context what is globalized is exactly the
above mentioned mentality daring to impose everyone not resembling itself to
obey it almost through the determination that “idea is me”.

In my opinion, what is aimed with the contests of universalisation and
globalisation is not sharing the universality in the explanation of the idea
with those who are globalizing but it is wrapping the idea’s competent state in
mystery by closing Idea to them in this way. As a result, Idea will be wrapped
in a thick fog due to a strange and inexplicable “irreversibility” cretaed
between “the one, previous” or “the one, ahead” and “the other” through idea.
Already, the reactive attitude, currently adopted by those who do not think and
live in compliance with this Idea and its determiantions, is based on this:
everything which is not known exactly creates a sense of oddity and the
arrogance it has disturbs even itself. Maybe as he was disturbed by Husserl’s
this completely arrogant style, Jaspers was giving the good news that the European
arrogance [hybris] was gone, in a speech he delivered in 1947.
Unfortunately the number of those waiting for that good news was very less than
expected.4

Plato’s triumph against Protagoras had actually declared the
predominance of the universal one over the individual one. Already, science
could find a door for itself in this direction. The defeat of Protagoras
getting acquainted with the world representation of the East through the Magoi
culture should actually be an important beginning for the problem of individual’s
loss! However the individual’s defeat against Idea should not be deemed to be
such a dreadful beginning, but its deserved value must be attached to the Idea!

Idea –if it really exists- can not be adopted “absolutely” by any culture
or civilisation. It can not be imposed to exist in a state contrary to its
quiddity as the property of any individual culture or only one civilisation.
What is called as Idea is maybe the book itself I mentioned above. If we spoil,
cloud the unity of meaning among the pages comprising this book due to
different arrangement of the characters in each page and veil some part of the
reality by reducing the problem to an absurd condition such as the superiority
of “the one, previous” over “the other” –and this is the case-; then we will
never have the chance of reading this book with which we have been presented
and we hold in our hands, from beginning to the end. What we call as Idea’s
explaining or realising itself means realizing with a useless arrogance –but
never reading in a completely correct way- just one page on which the light
cast.

If the people are continuosly misled by the deceitful strokes of this
useless arrogance, neither the East nor the West can take a real step to
understand and introduce their philosophers and the environment –all the
social, institutional and individual values and behaviours characterizing
them-from which they originated. Then the unique action, accomplished by the
minds lacking in this mutual realisation and understanding performance which
are very necessary for communication will be a superficial academic reading
activity and contemplating with the pleasure accumulated in the spirits through
this. Conveying the meaning beyond this-in these circumstances- will be in vain.

[1] “We may ask, “How is the spiritual image of Europe to
be charcterized?” This does not mean Europe geographically, as it appears on
maps, as though European man were to be in this way confined to the circle of
those who live together in this territory. In the spiritual sense it is clear
that to Europe belong the English dominions, the United States, etc., but not,
however, the Eskimo or Indians of the country fairs, or the Gypsies, who are
constantly wandering about Europe. Clearly the title Europe designates the
unity of a spiritual life and a creative activity –with all its aims,
interests, cares, and troubles, with its plans, its establishments, its
institutions. Therein individual human beings work in a variety of societies,
on different levels, in families, races, nations, all intimately joined
together in spirit and, as I said, in the unity of one spiritual image. This should stamp on persons,
groups, and all their cultural accomplishments an all-unifying character.” Pp.
155-156.

[2] “”The spiritual image of Europe” –what is it? It is
exhibiting the philosophical idea immanent in the history of Europe (of
spiritual Europe). To put it another way, it is its immanent teleology, which,
if we consider mankind in general, manifests itself as a new human epoch
emerging and beginning to grow, the epoch of a humanity that from now on will
and can live only in the free fashioning of its being and its historical life
out of rational ideas and infinite tasks.

[3] [Old Gr.] “esti d’ he men hule dunamis, to d’ eidos entelekheia, kai touto dikhos, to men
hos episteme, to d’ hos to theorein.” : [D] “Die materie ist
Potentz/Möglichkeit, die Form aber
ist Vollendung (Entelechie), und
dies in zweifachem Sine, zum einen wie (z.B.) eine Wissenschaft, zum andern wie
das Betrachten.” : [L] “Est autem quidem potentia, species autem endelechia [Lewis&Short’ta “entelechia”]. Et hoc dupliciter: hoc quidem sicut scientia, illud autem sicut
considerare.”